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ASSAULT AND BATTERY-ADMISSIBILITY-ABUSIVE LANGUAGE BY PLAIN-
TIFF.-THoMPSON V. SHELVERTON, 62 S. E. 220 (GA.) .- Held, in an action
for damages on account of an assault and battery, the defendant may give
in evidence any opprobrious words or abusive language used by the plain-
tiff to him in order to justify his conduct or mitigate the damages; and
it is for the jury to determine, in view of the character of the provocation
and the nature and extent of the battery, whether such opprobrious words
or abusive language amount to a justification, or only to a mitigation of
damages recoverable.
Under the common law, opprobrious words or abusive language
could not be pleaded in justification of an alleged assault and battery;
Bcrkncr v. Dannenberg, ii6 Ga. 954. As words never constitute an assault,
neither will they justify force in the protection against them, however
grossly abusive they may be; Cooley on Torts, 3rd Ed. 289. Mere words,
no matter how abusive they may be, never justify an assault; Murry v.
Boyne, 42 Mo. 472. No provocative words or epithets will justify an
assault, nor can they be given in evidence in mitigation of actual or com-
pensatory damages, but only upon the question of punitive damages;
Goldsmith's Aduir. z. Joy, 61 Vt. 488. Yet when used at the time or im-
mediately preceding the battery, may be shown in evidence under the
general issue in mitigation of damages; Mitchell v. Gambill, 14o Ala. 316.
Provocation cannot be shown unless it is so recent and immediate as to
form part of the transaction; Dupee v. Lentine, 147 Mass. 58o. Matters
of provocation must have happened contemporaneously with the assault
and battery, or so recently prior thereto, that the blood had not time to
cool; Keiser v. Smith, 71 Ala. 481. When provocation is not immediate,
but a sufficient time has elapsed for reflection and coolness, it is not admis-
sible, even in extenuation; Thrall v. Knapp, 17 Ia. 468.
BAILMENTS-ACTIONS-PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.-JOHN-
SON V. PERKINS, 62 S. E. 152 (GA.).-Held, that in all cases of bailment,
after proof of loss, the burden of proof is on the bailee to show proper
diligence.
This is in accord with the holdings of the courts in many states.
Burlingame v. Horne, 3o I11. App. 330; Baren v. Cain. 15 Ill. App. 387.
In New York the nature of the accident may be prima facie proof of
negligence and require proof from the bailee to counteract its effect.
Wintringham v. Hayes, 144 N. Y. i. Some courts, however, hold that the
bailor must not only show loss but also that the damage was caused by
the negligence of the bailee or his servants; James v. Orrell, 68 Ark. 284;
Willett v. Rich, I42 Mass. 356; Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend. (N. Y.); and
that the burden of proof may not be shifted to the bailee by showing that
the subject matter had been injured in such a way that does not ordinarily
occur without negligence. Maloney v. Taft, 6o Vt. 571.
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BASTARDs-LEGITIMIZATION-CONSENT OF MOTHER.-ALLISON V. BRYAN,
97 PAC. 282 (OKLA.).-The father of an illegitimate child married a
woman not its mother, and sought to legitimate the child by adopting it
into his family. To this the mother objected. Both parties appeared to be
able to care for the child. Held, that the primary question was the pre-
paration of the infant to confront the world in his lafer life, and that the
father was entitled to its custody, for the purpose of legitinization, even
though the mother objected. Williams, C. J., dissenting.
The general rule is that the mother of an illegitimate child has a
right to its custody and control and is bound to maintain it. Wright v.
IVright, 2 Mass. log; Fricsner v. Symonds, 46 N. J. Eq. 521. But the
father has no right as against the mother. Hudson v. Hills, 8 N. H. 417.
Nor is he entitled to it if the mother has moved to another state, married
a third person, and deserted the child. Olson v. Johnson, 23 Minn. 3ot.
Even the gift of the child to another person will not deprive her of the
right to subsequent custody. Dalton v. State, 6 Blackf. 357. According to
a statute, in one jurisdiction the father was entitled to possession of his
illegitimate child after giving a bond for its maintenance. Wright v. Ben-
net, 7 Ill. 587. However, the best interests of the child will be considered
when the legal right to custody is not fully and satisfactorily established.
Matter of Nofsinger, 25 Mo. App. 116.
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-DAMAGES-REcOVERY AGAINST HEIRS.
-JOHNSON V. LEVY, 47 So. 422 (LA.).-Held, that compensatory damages
may be recovered against the heirs of the descendant, for his breach of
promise of marriage.
At common law an action for breach of promise of marriage, where
no special damages are alleged did not survive against the personal repre-
sentative of the promisor. Stebbins v. Farmer, I Pick. 70. Because it was
regarded as a personal injury and died with the person. Hayden v. Vrec-
land, 37 N. J. L. 372. But a right of action survives against decedant's
personal representatives if his breach of promise causes special damage to
the property of the promisee. Finaly v. Chirney, 2o Q. B. D. 494. And an
allegation in a similar action that the promisee had a child born to her
out of wedlock, as a result of such promise, is not such an allegation of
special damages, to bring it within the rule. Hovey v. Page, 55 Me. 142.
In two jurisdictions, it is provided by statute that the right of action shall
not abate upon the death of the defendant. Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91;
Stewart v. Lee, 46 Atl. 31 (N. H.).
CARRIERS-INJURY TO PASSENGER-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-JoHN-
SON v. YAzoo & M. V. R. Co., 47 So. 785 (Miss.).-Held, that a passenger
is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in merely riding
on the platform of a vestibuled train.
Conflicting views are found on this question but the trend of late
decisions appears to be that it is not negligence per se to be on the plat-
form while the train is in motion. A railroad is responsible for the safety
of passengers in any place it provides for their accommodation. Globe v.
Delaware L. & W. R. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 5, 488a. And the modern
vestibuled platform is for the convenience of passengers and its compara-
tive safety invites use by them. Marquette v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co.,
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33 Ia. 562. Even as to open platform trains it is held in many jurisdictions
not negligence per se for a passenger to ride ol the platform of a car. See
Meesel v. Lynn etc., R. R. Co., 8 Allen 234; Gerstle v. U. P. R. R. Co., 23
Mo. App. 361. Contrary to the more liberal view in Loaisville & Nash-
ville R. R. Co. v. Morris, 23 Ky. L. R, 488; Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co.
v. Hoosey, 99 Pa. St. 492; The Cleveland, etc., Railway Co. v. Moneyhun,
146 Ind. r47, it was declared to he negligence as a matter of law for the
passenger to be riding upon the platform and a bar to recovery. For a
case in which this rule was asserted but contingent upon the company
providing seats. See Graham v. McNeil, 20 Wash. 466.
CARRIERS-PASSENGERS ON STREET CAR-RIGHT TO SEAT.-WEEKS V.
AUBURN & S. ELECTRIc Ry. Co., 113 N. Y. SuPP. 636.-Where plaintiff
accepted transportation in a crowded street car and surrendered her
ticket. held, that she waived strict performance so far as her contract
rights were concerned to a seat, and the only duty defendant then owed
her was that owing to a passenger who had contracted to ride standing.
The duty of a carrier of passengers to provide fit and suitable accom-
modations for all passengers that it receives for transportation includes
the duty to furnish a seat. Lane v. Choctaw, 0. & G. Ry. Co., 91 Pac.
883 (Okl.). A passenger who exhibits his ticket and demands a seat need
not surrender the ticket till the seat is furnished. Hardenbergh v. St.
Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.. 39 Minn. 3. It is not the duty of the passenger
to so act, in providing himself with a seat, that he perform that which
more properly is the duty of the conductor. Louisville, N., 0. & T. Ry.
Co. v. Patterson, 69 Miss. 421. Nor does he forfeit any rights by such
temporary inconvenience. Willis v. Long Island Ry. Co., 34 N. Y. 676. But
if he insists upon his right to a seat he cannot remain standing and ride
free; but should repudiate the contract in toto by quitting the train at the
first suitable opportunity and recover for breach of contract. Thompson
oi Carriers of Passengers, p. 67. Upon refusal to give up ticket he does
not thereby become a trespasser and can be ejected only at a regular
station. Maples v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 38 Conn. 557.
CONTRACTs-ACTroNS-MUTUAL MISTAKE.-COHEN v. HABERMAN, III
N. Y. Supp. 67.-Plaintiff and defendant had been partners, and the de-
fendant purchased the business and accounts, including rights to indemnity
against defalcations of bookkeeper. The cash on hand was to be equally
divided. There was no examination of the books at the time, but it was
subsequently discovered that the bookkeeper had forged the firm's indorse-
ment on checks received from customers. Forty-five hundred dollars was
recovered by the defendant from bondsmen and the bank which cashed the
checks, and the plaintiff sought to recover one-half. Held, that there was no
mutual mistake, and plaintiff could not recover. Scott, J., dissenting.
The only causes which render a mistake of fact the subject of relief
are the following: First, when the mistake constitutes a material in-
gredient in the contract of the parties and disappoints their intention by
mutual error. Allen v. Hammond, ii Pet. 63; Scruggs v. Drivers' Execu-
tors, 3z Ala. 274; Webster v. Stark, io Lea. (Tenn.) 4o6. Illustrating the
above rule is Dambmann v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55, holding that a mistake
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ab to the defendant's financial condition which might have influenced the
plaintiff's action, had he known of it, is no ground for equitable remedy.
Tle second cause for avoiding the agreement is where the mistake is in-
consistent with good faith, and proceeds from the violation of obligations
imposed by law upon the conscience of either party. Story's Eq. Jur., No.
15i; Wood '. Boynton, 64 Wis. 625; Thompson v. Jackson, 3 Rand. 5o4.
CO.MMERCE-INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-ST. & S. F. R. Co. v. STATE, 113
S. W. 203 (ARK.).-Held, a continuous transportation of freight between
points within a state is "interstate commerce," free from the interference
of the state, where a part of the route is outside of the state because of
the unsafe condition of a bridge forming a part of the line of road in the
state between such points.
The general rule is that all transportation of freight and passengers
from one state to another, or through more than one state, either by land
or water, is interstate commerce. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois,
IIS U. S. 557; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 562. The United States Supreme
Court holds, that the transportation of freight or passengers from one
point to another in the same state, either by land or water, where part
of the route is outside of the state, is interstate commerce and not under
the control of the state wherein it begins and ends. Lord v. Steamboat
Co., 102 U. S. 541. Some states, however, hold that such transportation is
not interstate commerce. Campbell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 86
]a. 587: State V. W. U. Tel. Co., 113 N. C. 213; Seazvell v. Kansas City,
Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 119 Mo. 222. In State v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 267, a distinction was made between a railroad line
which is operated, partly through another state, for transportation be-
tween points in one state, and one which carries on the ordinary business
of a common carrier along the line passing though the other state. The
right of a state to tax a railroad running between two points in the
state, but partly over the territory of another state, was expressly dis-
tit guished from an attempt by the state directly to regulate such transpor-
tation while outside of its borders. Lehigh Val. Ry Co. v. Penn., 145 U. S.
192; Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217.
CRIMINAL LAw-HUSBAND AND WIFE-SLANDER OF WIFE BY HUSBAND.
-STATE V. FULTON, 63 S. E. 145 (N. C.).-Held. that a husband may be
convicted of slandering his wife, under a statute providing that if any
person shall attempt in a wanton and malicious manner to destroy the
reputation of an innocent woman by words, written or spoken, imputing
unchastity, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Brown and Hoke, J. J.,
dissenting.
Slander was not a crime at common law, and it is only within com-
paratively recent times that statutes have been passed making certain
slanderous charges indictable. State v. Wakefield, 8 Mo. App. iu. The
most common of these statutory offenses is that of imputing a want of
chastity to a female. Stutts v. State, 52 So. 51 (Fla.) ; State v. Boos, 66
Mo. App. 537. Only two cases of a slander of the wife by the husband,
however, are to be found in the reports. One of these lays down the rule
that such a statute is all-embracing and includes slander perPr.-ed by
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the husband against his wife. Slayton v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 205. The
other is a North Carolina case which is overruled by a majority of the
court in the principal case, but upheld by the dissenting judges. State z
Eden, 95 N. C. 693. The basis of that decision was that "the law regards
the marriage relation as sacred, and leaves temporary differences and
wrongs between husband and wife to the corrective hand of time and
reflection. It is to be noted that the common law rule that the identity
of husband and wife prevented the wife from maintaining a civil action
against her husband, has, in the case of slander, been generally held to be
unaffected by statutes giving her a right of action for ilijuries to her
property and person. Frecthy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641; Mink v. Mink,
16 Pa. Co. Ct. i89.
INTEREsT-PROPERTY DESTROYED BY NEGI.IGENcE.-BUFL V. C., R. I. &
P. Ry. Co., 116 N. W. 29 (NEB.).-Held, where property is destroyed by
the negligence of another, the owner will be entitled to interest on the
value of such property from the time of its destruction.
When property is converted or lost to the owner by a trespass, the
plaintiff is entitled to interest on the value of it as a matter of law.
Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, lO4; Hale, Damages, p. 165. says
that it is very difficult to perceive any sound distinction, in this regard,
between cases where property is destroyed by a misfeasance, and where it
is destroyed by negligence. And some courts allow interest in such cases
as a matter of law. J., T. & K. TV. Ry. Co. v. P. L. T. & M. Co., 27
Fla. i; A., G. S. Ry. Co. v. McAlpine, 75 Ala. 113. Different views, how-
ever, have been adopted by other courts. Some hold that plaintiff is not
entitled to interest as a matter of law, but leave it to the discretion of the
jury. Frazer v. Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126; Lincoln v. Cla fin, 7 Wall. 132.
Others hold that interest will only be allowed if the damages are compen-
satory and not penal. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dunman, 6 Tax Civ.
App. li. While still others hold that no interest is recoverable in such
cases. H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Muldrow, 54 Tex. 233; DeSteiger v. H., S.
J. Ry. Co. 73 Mo. 33; unless the defendant receive some benefit by reason
of the injury. Kenney v. H. & S. I. Ry. Co., 63 Mo. 99. In Pennsylvania
it is held that where the damages are not in their nature capable of exact
computation, both as to time and amount, no interest is recoverable eo
nomnine. Richards v. Citizens N. G. Co., 130 Pa. St. 37.
DIVORE-GROUNDS-CRUELTY.-RYAN v. RYAN, 114 S. W. 464 (TEx.).
-Held, that where there is no evidence in a suit by a wife for divorce on
the ground of cruel treatment, of physical violence by the husband toward
her, and it is not shown that the husband's cruel treatment of the wife
produced a degree of mental distress threatening to impair her health,
the divorce should be refused.
The causes entitling one to divorce for extreme cruelty are such as
render life a great burden. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 21 Colo. j6. A divorce
will be granted if the proof shows wantonly cruel and inhuman treatment.
Hoyt v. Hoyt, 56 Mich. 5d. Cruelty means an actual personal violence, or
reasonable apprehension of it. Moyler v. Moyler, ii Ala. 62o. To con-
stitute legal cruelty to authorize a divorce there must be actual violence
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committed, attended with danger to life, limb or health, or reasonable
apprehension of such violence. Extreme cruelty may be such conduct
which produces mental suffering and destroys the peace of mind. Syh'is v.
Sylvis, II Colo. 327; Caruthers v. Caruthers, 13 Ia. 256; Cole v. Cole,
23 Ia. 433.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PROCEEDINGS-SECOND TRIAL.-NORTHERN PAC. Ry.
Co. ET AL. V. CITY OF GEORGETOWN, 97 PAC. 659 (WAsH.) .- Where a city
undertook to extend an avenue across railroad tracks, and a judgment of
condemnation with an award of damages was entered, held, that the city
could not, after abandoning the proceedings because of dissatisfaction with
the award, maintain proceedings for the extension across the tracks of
another avenue, located six inches south of the location of the first avenue,
in order to avoid the award of damages on the first trial and to obtain
a new trial on substantially the same proposition. Fullerton, J., dissenting.
The same rule applies in eminent domain proceedings as in a court of
law, and while one award remains in full force it is conclusive and the
petitioner is barred from instituting other proceedings involving the same
proposition. Sandford v. Wright, 164 Mass. 85. And where he attempts
to do so the remedy of the respondent does not lie in equity by injunction
but his remedy is at law by a motion to dismiss. Chicago, R. 1. & R.
Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 479. A discontinuance may be effected
by a dismissal pending an appeal, and subsequent proceedings may he
instituted to condemn another right of way over the same property, pro-
vided the dismissal was made in good faith. Corbin v. Cedar Rapids, I. F.
& N. W. Ry. Co., 66 Ia. 73. Statutes are to be construed as against the
release of private property from subservience to public use however great
the emergency. Trustees of C. S. Ry. Co. v. Haas, 42 Ohio St. 239. And
where it is provided by statute that the failure of petitioner to pay award
within a specified time shall constitute a discontinuance, new proceedings
may thereafter be immediately instituted. Ala. Midland Ry. Co. v. New-
ton, 94 Ala. 443; State v. City of 11Mi;uncapolis, 40 Minn. 483.
EQUITY-PERSONAL ASSETS-DET By HUSBAND TO WIFIE.-SHARPE V.
MILLER, 47 So. 701 (ALA.).-Held, that a debt by husband to wife, secured
by a mortage, is a personal asset, the title to which on the wife's death,
vests in her administrator.
It is apparently settled law, that whereas a debt passes to the executor
or administrator upon the death of the decedent, a mortgage given to
secure the debt is also a personal asset. Smith v. Dyer, 16 Mass. I8;
Bird v. Keller, 77 Me. 270. The principal case, however, is one that could
not have arisen at common law, and is interesting as showing the extent
to which the rule as to the invalidity of contracts and conveyances between
husband and wife has been abrogated. Kneil v. Egleston, 140 Mass. 202.
In England, money loaned by the wife, from her separate estate, to her
husband, upon his promise to .repay it, has long been recoverable in
chancery. Woodward v. Woodward, 3 DeG., J. & S. 672. In this country,
too, courts of equity in most jurisdictions have enforced such debts in the
absence of fraud or prejudice to third parties. Medsker v. Bonebrake,
io8 U. S. 66; Greiner v. Greiner, 35 N. J. Eq. 134. Contra: Woodward v.
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Spurr, 141 Mass. 283. Now, also, by virtue of statute in many states, a
wife may contract with her husband, or may convey and mortgage directly
to him. Mathcwson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23; Reynolds v. City National
Bank, 71 Hun. 386.
EVIDENcE-HEARSAY EVIDENCE-PEDIGREE.-SULLIVAN V. SOLIS, 114 S.
W. 456 (TE.).-Held, relationship and pedigree may be proved by hearsay
evidence.
Declarations concerning pedigree are an exception to the rule as to
the admission of hearsay evidence. DeHoven v. DeHoven, 77 Ind. 236.
But such declarations are allowed only where they are made, before the
commencement of the suit, by a deceased person, provided the person
making them was related by blood to the person to whom they refer, or
was the husband or wife of such person, McKelvey, Evidence, § 145; and
they are admissible when pedigree is only relevant and not the question
in issue. Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Inhabitants of Warren, 16 Gray
(Mass.) 17r. Contra: N. M. & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Simncoc, 14 Ky. Law
Rep. 526. However, hearsay will not be admitted if better evidence is
obtainable. Birney v. Hann, IO Ky. 322.
EVIDENCE-INsPECTION BY SMELL AND TASTE.-REED v. TERRITORY, 99
PAC. 583 (OKLA.).-Held, that upon a prosecution for selling intoxicating
liquor without a license, it was not error to permit the jury to look at
and smell the contents of a bottle which had been properly identified and
admitted in evidence, and which was alleged to contain whiskey.
Evidence by inspection includes all knowledge that is gained by a
tribunal through its senses, either what it sees, hears, tastes or smells.
State v. Linkhaw, 69 N. C. 214. The court generally has discretion as to
what it will allow the jury to see for itself, -even when both parties to
a cause assent. Marshall v. Gantt, 15 Ala. 682. In Maine and Michigan
it has been held that the jury may smell and taste liquor to determine the
contents of a bottle. People v. Kinney, 124 Mich. 486; State v. McCafferty,
63 Me. 223. Grave doubts as to the propriety of this, however, have been
expressed in Massachusetts and some other jurisdictions. Commonwealth
v. Brelsford, 161 Mass. 61; State v. Coggin, io Kans. App. 455. These
contrary views seem to be based on the ground that the less expert jurors
would receive evidence from the more expert as to the contents of the
bottle, in the privacy of the jury room, which would be against the rule
that a juror cannot be allowed to give evidence to his fellow jurors with-
out being sworn in. Wad-worth v. Dunnant, 117 Ala. 661; State v. Lind-
grove, I Kan. App. 51.
EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE AFFECTING WRITINGS-VARYING TERMS OF
CONTRACTs.-RUGGERIO v. LEUCHTENBURG, 113 N. Y. SuP. 616.-Held, that
where a written contract for the sale of land provided that the price
should be a sum certain" but stated no other terms, so that it must be pre-
sumed that the amount was payable in cash, parol evidence to show the
terms of payment varied the terms of the contract, and its admission was
error.
The general rule is, that when a contract is reduced to writing the
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contents of such document cannot be contradicted, altered, added to or
varied by parol or extrinsic evidence. Uihlein v. Matthews, 172 N. Y.
495; Pike v. McIntosh, 167 Mass. 309. Such evidence may, however, he
admitted when the terms of the contract are ambiguous. Burton v. O'Neill
Mfg. Co., 126 Ga. 8o5; Hunt' v. Gray, 76 Ia. 268. Also admissible to
supply terms as to which a contract is silent, but which are in accordance
with previous undisputed custom between the parties. Texas & P. Ry.
Co. z'. Coggin & Dunaway, 99 S. W. IO52 (Tex.). But, courts of equity
grant relief in cases of fraud and mistake by carrying the intention of the
parties into execution where the written agreement fails to express that
intention. Hunt '. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 211; Spriggs v. Bank of Mt.
Pleasant, 14 Peters 201; Ware v. Cowles. 24 Ala. 446. And where no
fraud or mistake in its execution is alleged, the terms of a written contract
cannot be varied, even in equity, by proof of a contemporaneous parol
agreement. Connecticut Fire Ins, Co. v. Buchanan, 141 Fed. 877 (Ia.);
Wore T'. Cozvles, 24 Ala. 446.
EVIDENCE-WR1TTEN INSTRUMENT-CoNTEMPORANEOUS VERBAL AGREE-
MENT.-PAULSON ET AL v. BoYD ET AL., 118 N. W. 841 (Wis.).-In a suit
on a note given for the price of certain mining stock, evidence of a con-
temporaneous verbal agreement that the payee would renew the note twice
for a similar period, and at the end of that time would accept a retransfer
of the stock in satisfaction (f the note at the maker's election, held, admis-
sible to show that the note was never delivered with intent that it should
consitute a completed instrument in praesenti. Finlin, Marshall, and Ker-
win, J. J., dissenting.
That parol evidence cannot be admitted to vary the terms of a written
contract absolute on its face is a well-settled rule of law. Brown v.
Spoffard, 95 U. S. 480. Cases of fraud, illegality or want of consideration
are exceptions to this rule. Carrington v. Maff, 112 N. C. 115. Evidence
of an oral agreement that a note is to become void upon the happening
of a condition subsequent is inadmissible under the rule. Potter v. Earnest,
45- Ind. 418. This rule excluding parol evidence to vary a written instru-
ment presupposes the existence in fact of such agreement; hence, the rule
has no application where the writing was not de!;vered as a present con-
tract but to become binding only upon performance of some condition
precedent resting in parol. McFarland v. Sikes, 54 Conn. 250; Reynolds v.
Robinson, 1io N. Y. 654. A note in the hands of a bona fide holder for
value cannot be affected by such evidence to his prejudice. Burnes v.
Scott, 117 U. S. 582.
GIFTS-UNDUE INFLUENcE-BURDEN OF PROOF.-GILMORE v. LEE, 86
N. E. 568 (ILL.).-Held, that the relation of priest or spiritual adviser and
parishoner is one of confidence, and a gift causa morris by a parishoner to
her priest is in and of itself prima facie void, and the burden of proof
rests on such priest to show that the gift was freely and voluntarily made,
and that it was not the result of undue influence. Scott, J., dissenting.
Freedom of will and good faith are as essential to the validity of a
gift as in other contracts; Ferguson v. Lowery, 54 Ala. 5IO; Garvin v.
Williams, 44 Mo. 465; and burden of proof is thrown on the donee to
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show that the gift was the free and voluntary act of the donor. Whipple
v. Barton, 63 N. H. 613; Parker v. Parker (N. J.), 16 Atl. 537. It
is not necessary to show by absolute evidence that undue influence was
exerted by donee at the time gift was made. Sears s,. Shafer. 2 Selden
(N. Y.) 268. And a donee before accepting a gift must satisfy himself
that donor had no family ties or that he was determined to disregard them.
Ford v. Hennessy, 70 Mo. 58o. But some cases hold gifts by fraud or im-
position are voidable only. and by one specially injured. Norris v. Norris,
3 Ind. App. 5oo.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S SERVICES-RIGHT OF HUSBAND TO RE-
COVER.-GORMAN v. N. Y. C. & ST. L. R. Co., II3 N. Y. Supp.--eld, that
in an action for injury to his son, plaintiff can recover the value of his
wife's services in nursing the son. Williams, J., dissenting.
The prevailing rule seems to be that where plaintiff is nursed by
members of his own family no action will lie for recovery of damages for
the value of the services thus rendered. Chicago & E. L R. Co. v. Hol-
land, 122 Ill. 461; Morris v. Grand Ave. R. Co., r44 Mo. 5oo. A case
upholding this rule is where services rendered plaintiff by her daughter
who made no charge for such services, could not be brought in as ground
for damages when said plaintiff was suing a railroad company for an
injury to herself. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Johnson, 24 II1. App. 468.
It has been held, however, that in an action for damages resulting from
personal injuries, a defendant is liable for the reasonable value of medical
attendance, care and nursing made necessary by the accident, although not
actually paid. Gries v. Zeck, 24 Ohio St. 329; and also though such ser-
vices may, as between the plaintiff and the person rendering them have
been gratuitous. Varnhain v. City of Council Bluffs, 52 Ia. 68.
INFANTS-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-A-VOIDANCE-RETURN OF CON-
SIDERATION.-HUGHES V. MURPHY, 63 S. E. 1248 (GA.).-Held, that the
rule which requires the restitution of the consideration in order to dis-
affirm an infant's contract applies only to the right of the infant himself
after he becomes of age and elects to disaffirm a contract made by him
during his minority, and that a guardian bringing a suit to recover the
possession of personal property which his ward has sold, is not required
to return the consideration received by the ward.
At common law to give effect to an infant's disaffirmance of his coii-
tract, it is not necessary that the other party should be placed in statu
quo. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142; Ruchinsky v,. DeHaven, 97 Pa.
202. But it has been held-in a few cases, that an infant vendor to recover
back his property must refund what he has received. and there can be no
right of recovery so long as any part of the consideration is withheld.
Stout v. Merrill, 35 Ta. 227; Chambers v. Jones, 72 IIl. 275. But the
general rule of law is that when disaffirming a deed because of infancy
when made, the party must return so much of the consideration received
as remains in his possession at the time of election, but he is not required
to return an equivalent for sucl part as may have been disposed of during
minority. Bloonter v. Nolan. 36 Neb. 51; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Ia. 195;
Reynolds v. McCurry, 1OO Ill. 356. In accord with the case at hand it is
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held, that the guardian of an adult may avoid any conveyance of property
executed by his ward while a minor, which might be avoided by the ward
himself if capable of exercising the right, and if money paid to the minor
as consideration for his conveyance of real estate has been wasted or spent
by him during his minority, payment of the amount is not necessary to
enable his guardian to avoid the conveyance. 7iandler v. Simmons, 97
Mass. 5o8.
INDIANs-ACTIONS-JRISDIcrON OF STATE.-DERAGON V. SERO, I8 N.
W. 839 (Wis.) Held, the laws of the state for the peace and good order
of people within its boundaries extend over Indian reservations, and
apply to infractions of such laws, whether by Indians or others.
The general rule is that the federal courts have jurisdiction over all
Indians, for, regarding them as ward of the nation, the United States has
full power to pass such laws as may be necessary to their full protection
and may punish all offences committed against them or by them within the
reservation. U. S. v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 577. And it is held that the state
courts have no jurisdiction in such cases. State v. Kagarua, 23 Cent. L.
J. 42o; Ii re Cross, 20 Neb. 417; State v. McKenney, 18 Nev. 182. But
when an Indian has severed his tribal relations he may be prosecuted in
the courts of the state whether the crime is committed within or without
the reservation. State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335. And if the crime is not
by an Indian against an Indian whether on or off the reservation, the state
courts have jurisdiction. Marion v. State, x6 Neb. 349.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJUR-.. TO THIRD PERSONs--MIsCONDUCT OF
SERVANT.-HoGLE v. H. H. FRAN.-IN MFG. Co., II2 N. Y. SuPP. 88i.-
Held, that the general rule that a master is not liable for a malicious act
of his servant, not done within the scope of his employment, does not
relieve the master from his own neglect to use reasonable means to prevent
a dangerous practise carried on by workman under his control and on his
premises. McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
The master is usually not liable for- the wilful and malicious acts of
his servant done outside of the course and scope of the employment.
Collins v. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co., io4 Ala. 39o. The liability of
the master is determined by the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is
founded on the power of control and direction which the superior has
a right to exercise and which for the safety of other persons he is bound
to exercise over the acts of his subordinates. I Blackstone Comm., 431. A
man can only use his property in such a manner as constitutes a reasonable
exercise of dominion, having regard to all interests affected and having
also in view public policy. Booth v. Rome, etc., Ry. Co., 14o N. Y. 267.
But the mere fact that a wrongful act occurred upon his property will not
make the doctrine of respondeat superior apply. Herbstritt v. Lacka.
Lumber Co., 212 Pa. St. 495. Where, however, the master has notice of a
dangerous practise being carried on by his employees and he does not take
reasonable care to prevent it, he will be liable, regardless of whether it
was malicious or in the scope of employment. Snow v. Fitchburg Railroad,
136 Mass. 552. Under such circumstances the master's permission is
implied. Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55.
RECENT CASES
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-ACCIDENTAL OR IM-
PROBABLE INJURY.-NELSON-BETHEL CLOTHING CO. V. P-rs, 114 S. W.
331 (Ky.).-Held, that a manufacturing company operating a number of
sewing machines, the belts of which were passed over a shaft, was not
bound to anticipate that an operator of a machine would get her hair
caught in the shaft while stooping down to connect the belt of her
machine with the shaft.
The prevailing American doctrine is that, for an injury which results
from pure accident, or from causes which could not reasonably be antici-
pated, unaccompanied by want or ordinary care on the part of the master,
he is not liable. Earnshaw v. Western Stone Co., 200 Ill. 220; McKee v.
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 83 Ia. 66; Moncuso v. Cataract Constr. Co., 34 N. Y.
Supp. 273. The master must use ordinary diligence in providing safe
machinery and secure places of employment for his servants; Frank v.
Otis, I5 N. Y. St. Rep. 681; Hallower v. Henley, 6 Cal. 2o9; but the duty
resting upon the master does not go to the extent of requiring him to
make accidental injuries impossible. Richards v. Rough, 53 Mich. 212;
Siogren v. Hall, 53 Mich. 274. If a servant knows, or by the exercise of
ordinary care, might know, of the danger, continuance in service without
objection results in a waiver and assumption of the risk; Hoben v. Bur-
lington & Mf. River R. Co., 20 Ia. 562; Muldowney v. Ill. Central R. Co.,
Ia. 615; and some courts have gone so far as to hold that a servant
assumes the risk when he is under virtual compulsion. Mahoney v. Dore,
I55 Mass. 513; Samson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144.
MURDER-EVIDENCE.-PEPLE v. GOVENALE, 86 N. E. 554 (N. Y.).-
Where an officer was shot while attempting to arrest the accused, who had
shot another person, held, that evidence of the latter shooting is inadmis-
sible in a prosecution for the former, to prove the accused guilty of the
crime charged.
Evidence tending to prove a similar but distinct offence from that for
which the accused is being tried is not admissible for the purpose of
Taising an inference that he committed the crime of which he is accused.
Bishop v. People, 194 Ill. 365. Evidence tending to prove other criminal
acts, in order to support the probabilities of the evidence that the accused
committed the particular act charged, is incompetent. People v. Wilson,
141 N. Y. 185; Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S. 450. Evidence of a distinct, inde-
pendent, substantive offence cannot be admitted at the trial for another
and different offence. But whether the facts amount to proof of a crime
other than that charged, and there is ground to believe that the crime
charged grew out of it, such facts may be proved to show the quo animo
of the accused. Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521; Commonwealth v. Ferrigan,
44 Pa. St. 386; State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245; Mayer v. People, 8o N. Y.
364. And, evidence of other transactions, otherwise material and relevant,
is not inadmissible merely because it tends to prove another crime. People
v. Van Tassel, I56 N. Y. 561; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418. Evidence
tending to prove material facts is admissible, although it may also tend
to prove the commission of another offence. Rice on Evidence, Vol. III,
J 155; Starkie on Evidence, Vol. II, § 380.
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NEGLIGENCE-INMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-GUEST OF AuToMOBILE DRIVER.-
CHADBOURNE V. SPRINGFIELD ST. Ry. Co., 85 N. E. 737 (MAss.).-Held,
where plaintiff, who was inexperienced in the operation of an automobile.
was injured while riding as the guest of an experienced driver, in a col-
lision between the automobile and a street car, there being no mutuality
in a common enterprise between them, the driver's ne'gligence, if any, was
not imputable to plaintiff.
The negligence of the driver of a wagon wherein plaintiff was a pas-
senger by invitation precluded plaintiff from recovering of a railroad com-
pany for injuries from a collision at a crossing. Payne v. C., R. I. & Pac.
R. R. Co., 39 Ia. 52; Slater v. B. C. R. & B. Ry. Co., 71 Ia. 209; Whittaker
v. City of Helena, 14 Mont. 124; Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v. Talbot, 48
Neb. 627. The weight of authority, however, holds that where the plain-
tiff rides in the vehicle of another, neither exercising nor assuming any
control over the movements of the team, the driver does not become the
agent of the plaintiff so that negligence contributing to an injury can be
attributed. U. P. Co. v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 174; Strauss v. Newburgh Ry.,
39 N. Y. Supp. 998.
PARENT AND CHILD-CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF CHILD--RIGHT OF
FATHER OF CHILD.-SUARENS ET AL. V. SUARENS, 97 PAC. 968.-Held, that
where a father was a well-to-do farmer, and was an educated man, and
had no immoral habits, and his second wife was well educated and of good
character,the court properly awarded to him the custody of a child by his
first wife, though the home furnished by the grand-parents of the child
was in some respects better than the home of the father.
The old common law rule gave the custody of children to the father
as against the mother, and especially as against third persons. Johnson v.
Terry, 34 Conn. 395. Yet the father may deprive himself of this right by
unfitness or voluntary transfer of his right to custody. Bently v. Terry,
59" Ga. 555. And unless a sufficient reason is shown, the transfer is
irrevocable. fames v. Cleghorn, 54 Ga. 9; State v. Barney, 14 R. 1. 62.
The child will never be restored unless for its own benefit. People Z,.
Lohman, 17 Att. Prac. 305. And the state can take the child from the
father, if he is an unfit person. Reynolds v. Howe, 5i Conn. 472; Cincin-
nati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197. But the father cannot be
deprived of access to his child. Matter of Jacquest, 46 N. Y. Misc. 575.
And always the welfare of the child is the principal factor in determining
its custody. U. S. v. Green, 3 Mass. 482; Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291.
PAROL LICENsES-REVOCATION.-YEAGER V. TUNING, 86 N. E. 657
(OHio).-The plaintiff and the defendant agreed orally to construct a
telephone line over and across their respective lands, to enable them to
have telephonic communication with each other, and with persons on other
lines. The line, as agreed upon, was built, was of a permanent nature, and
of the value of $25o.oo. The defendant three years afterward, cut the wire
and rendered the line useless. Held, that such an agreement created
merely a parol license, revocable at will. Davis. J., dissenting.
RECENT CASES
lany of the authorities hold that a parol license cannot be revoked,
after the licensee relying thereon has made expenditures. Smith v. Green,
iog Cal. 228. Even though there be no consideration given for the
privilege. School Dist. v. Lindsey, 47 Mo. App. 134. Some of the courts
hold that the doctrine of estoppel prevents the licensor from revoking in
such instances. Campbell v. Indianapolis & V. R. Co., iio Ind. 490,
Others, however, hold that the license may be revoked after a reasonable
opportunity has been given to remove improvements made. Ki-vett v. Mc-
Keittian, go N. C. io6. But in many instances, the question of expenditure,
consideration and notice has been disregarded, and it is held that the
licensor may revoke at will. Thoeinkc v. Fielder, 91 Wis. 386.
RAILROADS-ACCIDENTS AT CROSSINGS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-
KURT v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. Ry. Co., III N. Y. SuPP. 859.-Hcld, that a
person, going before daylight around a train obstructing a crossing, is not
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to see a
train on another track, backing at great speed without signals or other
warning and without lights except such as-are usually placed at the back
end of trains. McLennan, P. J. and Spring, J., dissenting.
To be innocent of contributory negligence in such cases, the injured
must have exercised that degree of care which the danger of the particular
crossing requires of an ordinarily prudent person. Fitzhugh v. Boston &
Maine R. R. Co., 8o N. E. 792. The almost universal rule is that one must
both look and listen vigilantly; Salter v. Utica & B, R. Co., 75 N. Y. 273;
and continuously until out of danger. Thompson v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.,
33 Hun. 6. One is not bound, however, to see or hear the danger;
Greany v. L. L R. Co., Ioi N. Y. 419, and a pedestrian who had looked
and listened and who was struck in the night time by a train backing
rapidly without lights or signals, was held not to be guilty of contributory
negligence. Garran v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 144 Mich. 26. Leaving a street
crossing in order to pass a train which is blocking the same, does not
constitute contributory negligence. Robinson v. Western Pac. R. Co.,
48 Cal. 409.
RAILROADS-INJURIES TO A TRESPASSER.-MORRIS v. GEORGIA R. &
BANKING Co., 62 S. E. 579 (GA.).-Plaintiff was riding on the engine of
a passenger train by invitation of the conductor, engineer and fireman, and
without paying or intending to pay any fare. It did not appear that there
was any custom permitting persons to so ride. Held, that plaintiff was a
trespasser, and that his widow had no cause of action against the company.
A master is liable for the acts of his servants, done in the conrse of
their employment, although they are done in disobedience of the mia.4ter'q
orders. Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U. S. 468: lW'oOd
on Railroads, p. 1382. But most of the authorities say that a conductor is
not authorized to invite a person to ride without paying a fare. And it
is not within the scope of his employment to invite a person to ride on the
engine. Files v. Boston & Albany R. R., 149 Mass. 204. Accrdinglv.
there is no liability on the company in such an instance. Rail-way Co. ,.
Cox, 66 Ohio St. 276. Especially, if defendant knew that the rules of the
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company forbade anyone riding on the engine. Virginia Midland R. R.
Co. v. Roach, 83 Va. 375. However, in one instance, it was held that an
engineer had no authority to permit a person to ride on the engine against
the rules of the company but if the conductor permitted him to ride there,
his consent would be considered as that of the company. C. & A. R. R.
Co. v. Michie, 83 Ill. 427.
